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1. Introduction 
In response to the call for evidence issued by the 
European and External Relations Committee of 
the Scottish Parliament, this submission pro-
vides a legal evaluation of the environmental di-
mension of the EU Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) and the possible implications of ‘Brexit’ for 
the sustainable exploitation of Scotland’s living 
marine resources. The following analysis is 
based on the premise that the UK fishing indus-
try is not a homogenous whole, but an amalgam-
ation of a broad range of diverse — and poten-
tially divergent — interests, which should be re-
flected in the outcome of any future negotiations 
with the EU. The Scottish industry in particu-
lar has its own unique features as regards the 
structure and characteristics of its fleet,1 the fish-
ing opportunities its vessels are engaged in,2 the 
intensity of its dependence upon EU markets,3 
and the immense value of its aquaculture ex-
ports,4 to name but a few. Against this back-
ground, this submission will show that adher-
ence to EU environmental legislation and 
fishery management principles and practices 
holds significant commercial potential for 
Scotland's fisheries (§2). 
                                                        
1 S. Dixon (ed.) (2015) UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2014, 
Marine Management Organisation, p. 11. 
2 Ibid, p. 12. 
3 D. Baldock et al. (2016) The potential policy and environ-
mental consequences for the UK of a departure from the 
 
 
European Union, Institute for European Environmental Pol-
icy, p. 89. 
4 Scottish Government, Scotland’s National Marine Plan, 
para 7.7. Available online at: http://bit.ly/2ci3Lw1. 
 
 
Key findings: 
 
 
• Today’s fisheries management is inevitably 
based on supranational and transboundary ar-
rangements, including through global and re-
gional fora in which the EU as the world’s largest 
fisheries market exercises considerable power. It 
is uncertain whether the UK will be able to play a 
significant role in these fora outside the EU. 
 
• The EU has a legal system based on successive 
improvements to legally enforce ambitious in-
ternational concepts such as the precautionary 
principle and the ecosystem-based approach to 
fisheries management. In addition, EU law at-
tempts to synergistically implement its Com-
mon Fisheries Policy (CFP) and general envi-
ronmental law. Outside of the EU, Scottish ex-
perience and research related to sustainable fish-
eries would not contribute to further reforms of the 
EU Fisheries Policy. 
 
• The UK shares most of its major fish stocks with 
neighbouring States. In the EU context, the politi-
cal tensions inherent in any effort to regulate and 
distribute fishing quotas for such shared stocks 
are largely diffused through the application of the 
relative stability principle as well as the principle 
of equal access. Even though these principles are 
problematic, stock distribution and access to the 
fishing grounds of other Member States would be 
subject to various spatial and quantitative re-
strictions that will likely negatively impact the 
British fishing industry. 
 
• Adherence to jointly set quantitative catch re-
strictions also has a considerable commercial 
value, as it is often a condition for obtaining sus-
tainability certification. 
 
• It is uncertain whether access to EU funding un-
der the European Structural and Investment 
Funds, which is significant for the sustainable de-
velopment of the fisheries and aquaculture sec-
tors, and is increasingly relevant for Scotland's is-
land communities, will still be available to Scottish 
fishing communities. 
  2 
Moreover, the recent history of the Scot-
tish industry has seen efforts towards sector-
building being undertaken simultaneously with 
efforts towards polity-building, with the transition 
towards sustainable fishing practices being re-
garded as conditional upon the evolution of 
Scotland into a devolved or even an entirely in-
dependent nation.5 Accordingly, this submission 
will focus on the trade-off that lies at the heart of 
the CFP, whereby supranationalism and the lib-
eralisation of access to fishing grounds and fish-
ery resources serve as the inescapable quid pro 
quo for the liberalization of trade in fisheries 
products.6 By contextualising this trade-off within 
the broader framework laid down by interna-
tional environmental law and the international 
law of the sea, this submission will show that su-
pranationalism and transboundary coopera-
tion are core elements of modern fisheries man-
agement (§3).  
From an environmental perspective, in 
the years that followed the adoption of the CFP, 
it became increasingly apparent that this policy 
was not only based on a number of false scien-
tific premises as regards the availability and re-
silience of fish stocks,7 but also contributed to 
the perpetuation and, in some cases, the aggra-
vation of unsustainable fishing practices. On the 
other hand, “the history of the EU’s fishing 
policy is one of criticism and improvement,”8 
with every reform of the CFP succeeding in bol-
stering the policy’s environmental components.9 
This submission will attempt to map out the pro-
gress that has been made in this connection, 
while also highlighting the contribution of other 
EU environmental policies (§4) and of funding 
opportunities under the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund (EMFF) (§5) to the sustainable 
management of fishery resources. The financial 
and regulatory incentives that are currently 
provided by the CFP, as well as the broader 
legal and institutional framework of the EU, 
                                                        
5 C. Carter (2014) The transformation of Scottish fisheries: 
Sustainable interdependence from ‘net to plate’, Marine 
Policy 44, p. 132. 
6 R. R. Churchill (1987) EEC Fisheries Law, Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, p. 132. 
7 D. Symes (1997) The European Community's Common 
Fisheries Policy, Ocean & Coastal Management 35:2-3, p. 
143. 
8 G. Carpenter, B. Stewart (2016) What has the EU done 
for UK fish? (Friends of the Earth, 1 April 2016). Available 
online at: http://bit.ly/2cmV4Rz. 
appear very significant for supporting the 
role of Scottish fishermen as stewards of ma-
rine ecosystems. The available options for pre-
serving these incentives — or, alternatively, for 
creating equivalent mechanisms to substitute 
them — should thus be one of the foci of the pub-
lic discourse on Brexit in Scotland. 
2. Allocation of fishery resources 
under EU Law  
Since the modern CFP was launched in 1983,10 
fishing opportunities have been allocated among 
Member States on the basis of the ‘relative sta-
bility principle,’ which seeks to ensure that the 
position of the fishing industry of each individual 
Member State is maintained over time, irrespec-
tive of any changes that might occur in the avail-
ability of stocks.11 When the relative stability 
principle was first introduced, it took into account 
historic catches, the loss of opportunities for 
some Member States as a result of the extension 
of national fishing zones to 200 nautical miles in 
the mid-1970’s, and the need to protect particu-
lar regions where local populations were espe-
cially reliant on the fishing industry. The latter el-
ement is reflected in the current CFP, which pro-
vides that the implementation of the relative sta-
bility principle should “safeguard and take full ac-
count of the particular needs of regions where 
local communities are especially dependent on 
fisheries and related activities.”12 This provision 
embodies the so-called ‘Hague Preference,’ 
which was established in 197613 with a view to 
ensuring that certain Member States would be 
entitled to increased quotas for a number of 
key stocks that support fishing-dependent 
communities — an arrangement that the UK, 
9 For an overview of the measures taken under the latest 
CFP reform to strengthen the policy’s environmental di-
mension see D. Baldock et al. (2016) supra, n. 3, p. 85. 
10 Regulation (EEC) No. 170/83. 
11 The relative stability principle is enshrined in Articles 16 
and 17 of Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013. 
12 Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013, Preamble, paras 35-37. 
13 Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 on certain exter-
nal aspects of the creation of a 200-mile fishing zone in the 
Community with effect from 1 January 1977. 
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and in particular Scotland,14 has historically 
benefitted from.15 
The relative stability principle was intro-
duced in parallel with the concept of ‘total allow-
able catch’ (TAC), which represents the specific 
quantity that can be taken from a species or 
group of related species in a certain geographic 
region on a yearly basis. TACs are set at the EU 
level based on the scientific advice provided by 
the International Council for the Exploration of 
the Sea (ICES) and the Scientific, Technical and 
Economic Committee on Fisheries (STECF) with 
reference to the biological status and optimal 
catch limits of different commercial stocks as 
well as the predicted socioeconomic impact of 
different TAC packages. Having received this 
advice, the European Commission consults with 
Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) as well as 
with any third countries that have a vested inter-
est in the regulated stocks, including Iceland, the 
Faroe Islands and Norway. The latter consulta-
tions are most often carried out under the auspi-
ces of the competent Regional Fisheries Man-
agement Organizations (RFMOs). The input re-
ceived by the Commission through these pro-
cesses is ultimately incorporated into a set of 
suggestions addressed to the Council of Fisher-
ies Ministers of EU Member States, who have 
the power to decide on the legally binding 
TACs.16 TACs are subsequently divided into na-
tional fishing quotas, with a different allocation 
percentage being applied per Member State for 
each stock (the so-called ‘relative stability key’). 
National quotas are then distributed by each 
Member State based on “objective criteria,” in-
cluding those of socioeconomic and environ-
mental nature.17  
The fact that the final, legally binding de-
cision on TACs emerges from what is a quintes-
                                                        
14 A. Wright (2004) Who Governs Scotland?, Routledge, p. 
119. 
15 HM Government (2014) Review of the Balance of Com-
petences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union, Fisheries Report, p. 14. 
16 G. Carpenter et al. (2016) Landing the blame: The influ-
ence of EU Member States on quota setting, Marine Policy 
64, p. 10. 
17 Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013, Articles 16 and 17. 
18 F. Franchino & A. J. Rahming (2003) Biased Ministers, 
Inefficiency, and Control in Distributive Policies: An Appli-
cation to the EU Fisheries Policy, European Union Politics 
4:1, pp. 11–36. 
sentially political process among Fisheries Min-
isters has allowed Member States to argue for 
quotas that have systematically exceeded the 
levels suggested by the Commission.18 The rel-
ative stability principle has been identified as a 
contributing factor in this phenomenon, as it 
forces Member States seeking a higher national 
quota to press for an increase of the overall 
Community TAC.19 This might explain why ex-
cess TACs are mostly observed in areas where 
the relative stability principle puts pressure on 
States to maintain their historically high quotas: 
in terms of volume, Denmark, the UK and Spain 
accounted for just under half of the Union's ex-
cess TACs between 2001 and 2015.20 In terms 
of geographic representation, this trend has 
been primarily observed in Western Member 
States, and in particular those among them that 
have a claim in the major fishing areas of the 
Northeast Atlantic ecoregion.21 For its part, the 
EU is the provider of both the political plat-
form that allows for these detrimental prac-
tices to occur and that develops the legal 
safeguards that can be used to curb them. 
The latter include the application of the precau-
tionary approach to fisheries management and 
the obligation to ensure that marine biological re-
sources are exploited in such a manner, so as to 
allow for the restoration and maintenance of the 
populations of harvested species above levels 
that can produce maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY).22 
There is a general consensus among 
commentators that, should the UK cease to be a 
Member of the EU, quotas would be maintained 
as the principal mechanism for allocating fishery 
resources.23 Before exploring how quota alloca-
tion could be carried out after Brexit, it is worth 
noting that adherence to quantitative catch 
19 COM (2009)163 final (22.4.2009), p. 16. 
20 G. Carpenter et al. (2016) supra, n. 16, p. 13. 
21 Ibid, p. 11. 
22 Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013, Article 2(2). 
23 DEFRA Minister George Eustice, who was a firm sup-
porter of the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign and a vocal critic of the 
CFP, has stated that “while quotas are not perfect, they are 
the only system that works in a shared fishery with mobile 
species.” To this effect, see G. Eustice, The Fishing Indus-
try and Brexit (13 April 2016). Available online at: 
http://bit.ly/2bXWsJB.  
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limits can also have considerable commer-
cial value, as it is often a crucial condition for 
obtaining sustainability certification.24 The 
‘mackerel wars’ of recent years between the UK, 
Iceland and the Faroe Islands serve as a cau-
tionary tale in this respect. The breakdown of 
TAC-setting and quota allocation arrangements 
eventually led to the suspension of the certifica-
tion that had been awarded to the stock by the 
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC).2526 This di-
mension of the quota system is bound to be 
exceptionally significant for Scotland’s fish-
eries, since a remarkable 90% of the Scottish 
pelagic industry has already been certified 
by the MSC.27 
3. Allocation of fishing rights and 
the duty to cooperate under 
international law  
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides that, within the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), coastal States 
have “sovereign rights for the purpose of explor-
ing and exploiting, conserving and managing” 
living natural resources.28 In exercising these 
rights, the coastal State shall have due regard to 
the rights of other States.29 Moreover, when 
granting other States access to its EEZ, the 
coastal State shall take into account, inter alia,  
the significance of the living resources of the 
area to the economy of the coastal State con-
cerned as well as the need to minimise eco-
nomic dislocation in States whose nationals 
                                                        
24 S. Walmsley (2016) Brexit: Where next for UK fisheries?, 
ABP Mer, p. 1. 
25 C. Davies, Britain prepares for mackerel war with Iceland 
and Faroe Islands (The Guardian, 22 August 2010). Avail-
able online at: http://bit.ly/2bTxPyF. 
26 Mackerel wins back its certified sustainable status (Ma-
rine Stewardship Council, May 11 2016). Available online 
at: http://bit.ly/2c9EZkL. 
27 C. Carter (2014) supra, n. 5, p. 131. 
28 UNCLOS, Article 56(1)(a). 
29 UNCLOS, Article 56(2). 
30 UNCLOS, Article 62(3). 
31 UNCLOS, Article 63(1). 
32 UNCLOS, Article 63(2). 
33 UNCLOS, Article 64(1). 
34 Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013, Article 2(3). 
35 UNFSA, Article 5(d) and (e). 
have habitually fished in the zone or which have 
made substantial efforts in research and identifi-
cation of stocks.”30  
Where the same stock occurs within the 
EEZs of two or more coastal States, these 
States “shall seek, either directly or through ap-
propriate subregional or regional organisations, 
to agree upon the measures necessary to coor-
dinate and ensure the conservation and devel-
opment of such stocks.”31 Where a stock occurs 
within the EEZ as well as in an area beyond and 
adjacent to this zone, the coastal State is bound 
by an analogous duty to cooperate with the 
States fishing for the stock in the adjacent 
area.32 Cooperation is also foreseen in the case 
of highly migratory species.33 
The obligation of transboundary co-
operation is thus a key component of the 
ecosystem-based approach,34 which requires 
fisheries management to be carried out on an 
ecologically meaningful scale that follows the 
natural boundaries of environmental processes 
instead of the arbitrary boundaries of territorial 
borders. This management approach is en-
shrined in key instruments: the 1995 Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the 1995 
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UN-
FSA),35 and the Decisions adopted by the States 
Parties to the 1992 Convention on Biological Di-
versity (CBD).36 
Due to the geographic position of the UK, 
most of its major fish stocks are shared with 
neighbouring States.3738 Within the context of the 
EU, the political tensions inherent in any effort to 
regulate and distribute such stocks are largely 
36 CBD, COP 7 Decision VII/11. 
37 In a research paper prepared for the House of Commons 
in 1996, Barclay predicted that, had the EU not existed or 
its legislation not extended to fishing, the proximity of the 
UK to other States would have forced it to set up some sys-
tem of joint access even in areas within 200 nautical miles 
from the coast. To this effect, see C. Barclay (1996) The 
EU Common Fisheries Policy, Science and Environment 
Section, House of Commons Library, Research Paper No. 
96/6, p. 15. 
38 V. M. Trenkel (2014) Comparative ecology of widely dis-
tributed pelagic fish species in the North Atlantic: Implica-
tions for modelling climate and fisheries impacts, Progress 
in Oceanography 129:B, pp. 219–243.  
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diffused through the application of the relative 
stability principle as well as the principle of ‘equal 
access,’39 which requires Member States to en-
sure equal conditions of access to and use of the 
fishing grounds situated in the waters within their 
jurisdiction for all EU fishing vessels.40 Small-
scale British fishermen, who are largely unable 
to benefit from the fishing opportunities provided 
by the principle of equal access, maintain that 
the CFP forces them to compete with foreign 
fishermen for what they perceive to be a dwin-
dling ‘national’ resource. The reality of the situa-
tion is that, should the principles of equal ac-
cess and relative stability cease to apply fol-
lowing the UK’s exit from the EU, the access 
of British vessels to the fishing grounds of 
other Member States would be subject to 
spatial and quantitative restrictions that will 
negatively impact on the British fishing in-
dustry.41  
The example of Norway is pertinent in 
this regard, as the bilateral agreement con-
cluded with the EEC in 1980 provided for a grad-
ual reduction in the fishing rights allotted to the 
vessels of each Party with reference to the areas 
falling within the jurisdiction of the other, with a 
view to reaching a “mutually satisfactory balance 
in their reciprocal fisheries relations.”42 Based on 
this ‘umbrella’ agreement, the EU and Norway 
have been renegotiating the framework govern-
ing the management of shared stocks and in par-
ticular the cooperative elaboration of the corre-
sponding TACs on an annual basis. The main 
criterion for the allocation of TACs among the 
                                                        
39 As part of their accession agreements, the candidate 
countries negotiated a ten-year derogation from this princi-
ple that would allow them to restrict fishing in waters situ-
ated within a limit of 6 nautical miles calculated from the 
baselines of their coasts. To this effect, see Council Deci-
sion on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland 
and the United King-dom (OJ L 73, 27.3.1972), Articles 100 
and 101. This derogation, has since been extended to 12 
nautical miles (except where Member States had historic 
access) and renewed a number of times, most recently until 
the end of 2022 by Article 5(2) of Regulation (EU) No. 
1380/2013. It is worth mentioning that the role played by 
the right of establishment and the principles of proportion-
ality and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality in the 
context of the EU fisheries policy was at the core of the 
seminal judgment of the European Court in Case C-221/89 
Factortame [1991] ECR I-3905. 
40 Regulation (EEC) No. 2141/70, Preamble and Article 2. 
41 S. Walmsley (2016) supra, n. 24, p. 3. 
42 Agreement on Fisheries between the European Eco-
nomic Community and the Kingdom of Norway, OJ L 226, 
two parties is that of ‘zonal attachment,’ i.e. the 
spatial distribution of the stock over time and 
over its various life stages.43 In the case of the 
UK, even though the criterion of zonal attach-
ment would most probably be applied together 
with relevant economic indicators and historical 
fishing rights,4445 it might still lead to a less ad-
vantageous outcome for the British industry than 
the current arrangement based on the principles 
of the CFP. 
Negotiations pertaining to the manage-
ment of those stocks that are shared between 
the UK, the EU and third countries will most likely 
be carried out in the context of the competent 
RFMOs, of which the North East Atlantic Fisher-
ies Commission (NEAFC) is the most promi-
nent.46 Since fisheries management is an exclu-
sive competence of the Union,47 it is often only 
the EU that has the right to become a member 
of these organisations. If, however, an RFMO 
has an environmental mandate that goes be-
yond fisheries management — and granted that 
environmental policy-making constitutes a 
shared competence between the Union and the 
Member States48 — both will become members 
and have the right to intervene based on a mu-
tually agreed allocation of powers.49 The Con-
vention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR) is a characteristic 
example of such an RFMO, while similar ar-
rangements govern participation in the fisheries 
29.8.1980, pp. 48–50, Article 2(1)(b); Annex, paras 1 and 
3. 
43 S. Walmsley (2016) supra, n. 24, p. 3. 
44 D. Baldock et al. (2016) supra, n. 3, p. 93. 
45 D. Dankel et al. (2015) Allocation of Fishing Rights in the 
NEA, Discussion Paper, TemaNord 2015:546, p. 65. 
46 I. Popescu (2016) Beyond the European seas: The ex-
ternal dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy, Euro-
pean Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), p. 12. Other 
RFMOs that are active in the region and focus on specific 
species include the International Commission for the Con-
servation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the North Atlantic 
Salmon Conservation Organisation (NASCO). 
47 TFEU, Article 3(1)(d). 
48 TFEU. Article 4(2)(e). 
49 E. Penas Lado (2016) The Common Fisheries Policy: 
The Quest for Sustainability, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 152 et 
seq. 
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advisory bodies that have been established un-
der Article VI of the FAO Constitution.50 
The UK is already playing a leading part 
in a number of RFMOs, albeit as a Member State 
of the EU. It may thus be expected that the UK 
will be required to re-apply for membership,51 
in which case it will enter into the obligations that 
are currently held by the EU, including as re-
gards financial contributions to the budget of the 
corresponding organisation, the transposition of 
any recommendations it might issue, and the im-
plementation of the conservation and manage-
ment measures adopted under its auspices.52 
On the other hand, the individual bargaining 
power of the UK will likely be limited, since 
the status of the EU as the world’s largest 
fisheries market gives it a decisive role in in-
ternational fora.53 Scotland, which has contrib-
uted to the formulation of the EU’s fisheries pol-
icy from its position within the UK,54 will inevita-
bly be affected by this turn of events. The reality 
of modern fisheries management makes it so 
that the ability of States to make entirely sover-
eign decisions over fisheries and act unilaterally 
is generally limited. This would be true for Scot-
land regardless of whether it participated in the 
aforementioned fora through the UK or the EU. 
What would differ is arguably the amount of in-
fluence exerted by the political entity that would 
act as the mouthpiece of Scottish interests in 
each case. 
4. Marine environmental 
protection under EU Law  
The long-term environmental sustainability of 
fishing and aquaculture activities, and the con-
servation of marine biological resources have 
                                                        
50 E. J. Molenaar (2003) Netherlands fisheries in a Euro-
pean and international legal context, Netherlands Yearbook 
of International Law 2002, pp. 159. See, e.g., the Fishery 
Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF), insti-
tuted by FAO Council Resolution 1/48 (June 1967); West-
ern Central Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC), insti-
tuted by FAO Council Resolution 4/61 (November 1973). 
51   D. Baldock et al. (2016) supra, n. 3, pp. 89-90. 
52 COM (1999) 613 final, 08.12.1999, p. 10. 
53 HM Government (2014) supra, n. 15, p. 43. 
54 HM Government (2014) Scotland analysis: EU and inter-
national issues, pp. 7 and 13. 
been elevated into explicit objectives of the 
CFP.55 As regards the latter objective, it is worth 
noting that, even though fisheries constitute an 
area of shared competence between the EU and 
Member States,56 the conservation of marine bi-
ological resources falls within the scope of the 
Union’s exclusive competence.57 The EU is thus 
authorized to adopt a broad range of conserva-
tion measures, including those aimed at adapt-
ing the fishing capacity of fishing vessels to 
available fishing opportunities; incentives to pro-
mote fishing methods that contribute to more se-
lective and less impactful fishing; measures per-
taining to the characteristics of fishing gears and 
the rules governing their use; and restrictions 
upon fishing activities within spatially and tem-
porally demarcated boundaries with a view to 
protecting vulnerable marine resources.58 
Due to the fact that the conservation of 
marine biological resources is an exclusive EU 
competence, Member States have often been 
unable to adopt the measures necessary for 
meeting their obligations under the Birds59 and 
Habitats60 Directives in the marine context. In 
Scotland, for instance, marine Special Areas of 
Conservation (SACs), i.e. protected areas des-
ignated under the Habitats Directive with refer-
ence to ecologically significant habitats or spe-
cies, have been primarily targeted at marine 
species that are not involved in commercial fish-
ing, such as the bottlenose dolphin, the common 
(Harbour) seal and the grey seal. Fish, on the 
other hand, have been ‘incidentally’ protected 
through SACs targeted at marine habitats, in-
cluding coastal lagoons, estuaries, mudflats, 
reefs and sandbanks.61 That being said, the re-
formed CFP has granted Member States some 
much-needed leeway in adopting the conserva-
tion measures required by the Union’s environ-
mental legislation,62 thus settling the “dilemma of 
competence” between Member States and the 
55 Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013, Article 2(1) and (2). 
56 TFEU, Article 3(1)(d). 
57 TFEU, Article 4(2)(d). 
58 Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013, Article 7. 
59 Directive 2009/147/EC 
60 Directive 92/43/EEC. 
61 More information on Scottish marine SACs is available 
on the website of Scottish Natural Heritage: 
http://bit.ly/2bXWWPN. 
62 Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013, Article 11(1). 
 
  7 
EU.63 It should, however, be borne in mind that 
fish stocks which are distributed over large 
areas (e.g. Atlantic cod) or are highly migra-
tory (e.g. mackerel) cannot be effectively pro-
tected through the spatially restricted 
measures foreseen by the Birds and Habitats 
Directives.64 
In addition to the aforementioned Direc-
tives, the CFP coexists with a number of other 
policies that contribute to the protection of the 
marine environment, including the Marine Strat-
egy Framework Directive, which creates a legal 
obligation for Member States to take the neces-
sary measures to achieve or maintain the good 
environmental status of European marine waters 
by 2020;65 the Water Framework Directive, 
which provides for the attainment of the good 
qualitative and quantitative status of all Euro-
pean water bodies;66 the Maritime Spatial Plan-
ning Directive, which seeks to contribute to the 
concerted and sustainable development of vari-
ous marine and maritime economic sectors as 
well as to the preservation, protection and im-
provement of the marine environment;67 and, fi-
nally, the Environmental Impact Assessment Di-
rective, which also provides for the Strategic En-
vironmental Assessment of plans and pro-
grammes (EIA and SEA respectively).68 In this 
connection, it is noteworthy that the CFP 
acknowledges the use of “impact assessments” 
as a good governance principle.69 The relevant 
provision of the CFP should be understood to 
encompass not only EIAs and SEAs, but also the 
“appropriate assessment” laid down by the Hab-
itats Directive, which applies to plans and pro-
jects that are not directly connected with or nec-
essary for the management of the areas com-
prising the Natura 2000 network, but are likely to 
have a significant effect thereon.70  
The synergistic implementation of the 
aforementioned policies and their infusion into 
                                                        
63 J. Leijen (2011) The Habitats and Birds Directives versus 
the Common Fisheries Policy: A Paradox, Mercourios 
(Utrecht Journal of International and European Law) 27:73, 
pp. 19-45. 
64 A. Kempf (2010) Ecosystem approach to fisheries in the 
European context – history and future challenges, Journal 
of Applied Ichthyology 26:1, p. 104. 
65 Directive 2008/56/EC. 
66 Directive 2000/60/EC. 
67 Directive 2014/89/EU. 
68 Directive 2001/42/EC. 
69 Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013, Article 3(i). 
the CFP is foreseen by the principle of environ-
mental integration, which is enshrined in Article 
11 TFEU. This principle serves an “enabling 
function,” which allows environmental measures 
to be adopted under non-environmental policies, 
as well as a “guidance function,” which allows 
environmental principles to be applied in a non-
environmental context.71 Even though the CFP 
is still in the process of integrating fisheries man-
agement and environmental conservation, the 
EU has “gradually managed to legally enforce 
environmental principles that are still merely an 
aspiration in international law,” including the pre-
cautionary principle and the ecosystem-based 
approach.72 In exercising its devolved compe-
tences in the areas of the environment and fish-
eries, the Scottish Government has at times 
been inspired by EU law objectives to pursue 
policies that are more proactive than those 
adopted elsewhere in the UK. 73  By distancing 
itself from any future efforts to reform the 
CFP — which, judging from the current track 
record, will likely set more ambitious objec-
tives for sustainable fisheries management 
in light of lessons learnt in implementation 
and intervening international developments 
—  Scotland may thus be deprived of a level 
of ambition and external accountability that 
may not be guaranteed at the national level.  
5. Funding  
The EU provides financial support to the fishing 
industry primarily through the EMFF. The objec-
tives of this Fund are meant to be pursued in line 
with the Union’s efforts to promote the preserva-
tion, protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment, as set out in the provisions 
of Articles 11 and 191 TFEU.74 More specifically, 
funding under the EMFF must contribute to the 
70 Council Directive 92/43/EEC, Article 6(3); Case C-127/02 
Waddenzee [2004] ECR I-7405. 
71 J. H. Jans (2011) Stop the Integration Principle?, Ford-
ham International Law Journal 33:5, pp. 1540-1541. 
72 D. Baldock et al. (2016) supra, n. 3, p. 86. 
73 T. Travers (2016) Implications of a Brexit for UK National 
Governance and Local Government: Report of the hearing 
held on 13th April, 2016, p. 10. 
74 Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, Article 8. 
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attainment of the Union's priorities for the sus-
tainable development of fisheries and aquacul-
ture, including the reduction of the impact of fish-
eries on the marine environment; the protection 
and restoration of aquatic biodiversity and eco-
systems; and, perhaps most importantly, the 
achievement of a balance between fishing ca-
pacity and available fishing opportunities.75 With 
respect to the latter element, the European 
Court of Auditors, however, has found that in-
vestments on board fishing vessels funded by 
the EMFF have in some cases increased the 
ability of individual vessels to catch fish, thus fur-
ther exacerbating the problem of fleet overca-
pacity.76  
Funding under the EMFF is allocated to 
Member States based on the size of their fishing 
industries. Each individual State proceeds to 
draw up an operational programme detailing 
how the funding will be spent. Once the opera-
tional programme is approved by the European 
Commission, it is up to the national authorities to 
decide which projects will be funded. Adopted on 
3 December 2015, the UK’s Operational Pro-
gramme for the period 2014-2020 entails a total 
budget of € 309,993,982, of which € 
243,139,437 is provided by the EU (co-funding 
of 78.43%).77 The funds allocated to Scotland, 
which amount to approximately €107,000,000, 
will focus on sustainable economic growth in the 
fisheries and aquaculture sectors, and assisting 
communities to deliver economic benefits during 
the transition phase of the CFP reform pro-
gramme.78 During the early stages of implemen-
tation, particular focus will be given to invest-
ment which supports, inter alia, the operationali-
zation of the landing obligation; technical inno-
vation, including for the purposes of improved 
selectivity; the development of the inshore sec-
tor; and access to markets for Scottish seafood 
products.79 
                                                        
75 Regulation (EU) No 508/2014, Article 6. 
76 European Court of Auditors (2011) Have EU Measures 
Contributed to Adapting the Capacity of the Fishing Fleets 
to Available Fishing Opportunities, Special Report No. 12, 
p. 26. 
77 European Maritime and Fisheries Fund - Operational 
Programme for the United Kingdom: http://bit.ly/2bKoThZ. 
78 Marine Scotland (2015) European Maritime and Fisher-
ies Fund (EMFF), Topic Sheet No. 111 V3. 
79 More information can be found on the website of the 
Scottish government: http://bit.ly/2c9GFKW. 
Following the UK’s exit from the EU, it 
remains to be seen if the British and Scottish 
Governments will undertake efforts to en-
sure that an analogous funding scheme is 
set up, as the cumulative effects of ‘disentan-
gling’ the British fishing industry from the 
CFP are bound to have significant economic 
consequences. These consequences will be 
particularly palpable in Scotland’s island com-
munities, including those of the Shetland and 
Orkney Islands and the Western Isles. These ar-
eas, which are characterized by “a number of so-
cio-economic features combining peripherality, 
sparsity of population, insularity, […] a narrow 
economic base, low wages, out-migration, iso-
lated communities and limited opportunities to 
diversify the economic base,”80 have benefitted 
considerably from the financial support provided 
by the European Structural and Investment 
Funds.81  
It is worth noting that the special needs 
of islands have been acknowledged as one of 
the principal priorities of the Union’s economic, 
social and territorial cohesion policy.82 A Resolu-
tion adopted by the European Parliament in Feb-
ruary 2016 stressed the importance of cultivating 
synergies between the European Structural and 
Investment Funds and other Union instruments, 
“with a view to counterbalancing the handicaps 
of islands and enhancing their economic growth, 
job creation and sustainable development situa-
tion.”83 The Resolution further affirmed that aq-
uaculture, breeding and fisheries constitute an 
important element of local island economies, 
which are a source of supply for a significant part 
of the agro-industrial sector.84 As Scotland’s 
Minister for Transport and the Islands is pre-
paring to table a draft Islands Bill which is ex-
pected to devolve more powers to the island 
councils, it is worth considering potential 
80 HIEP (date unknown), Response to the Consultation on 
the Future of Cohesion Policy, p. 2. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Article 174 TFEU. 
83 European Parliament resolution of 4 February 2016 on 
the special situation of islands (2015/3014(RSP)), para 12. 
84 Ibid, para I. 
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benefits for local communities from new op-
portunities under an ‘EU Strategic Frame-
work for Islands.’85 
6. Conclusions 
The fisheries industry is highly reliant upon envi-
ronmental health as a prerequisite for the abun-
dance and resilience of fish stocks. In turn, the 
intrinsic characteristics of the marine environ-
ment, including the transboundary nature of 
many of its features and processes and the high 
degree of mobility exhibited by its living re-
sources, render the elaboration of cooperative 
management strategies an absolute necessity. 
The EU is a platform for intergovernmental co-
operation in and of itself, as well as a powerful 
international actor with a considerable amount of 
influence in the international fora where fisheries 
governance is increasingly taking place. It is 
through this prism that Scotland’s future relation-
ship with the EU must be regarded, in the con-
text of the inevitably supranational and trans-
boundary nature of today’s fisheries govern-
ance. 
Ultimately, in order to determine whether the 
benefits of EU Membership for the Scottish fish-
ing industry and marine environment outweigh 
the costs, it is necessary to approach the CFP 
as a living organism that is perpetually evolving 
in order to achieve a high level of environmental 
protection.86 Today, following four decades of 
learning through trial and error, the CFP has 
overcome many of its initial shortfalls, becoming 
a considerably more comprehensive and envi-
ronment-oriented policy. There is no reason to 
think that the next round of reforms will not intro-
duce further improvements to the management 
mechanisms the CFP operates upon. By draw-
ing from the rich experience gained by its fishing 
industry on the ground as well as the research 
carried out by its academic community, Scotland 
can make a valuable contribution to this process. 
Additional research within the Strathclyde Cen-
tre for Environmental Law and Governance 
(SCELG) will endeavour to contribute to this ef-
fort. 
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